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Abstract—Cyber-attacks against Smart Grids have been 
found in the real world. Malware such as Havex and 
BlackEnergy have been found targeting industrial control 
systems (ICS) and researchers have shown that cyber-attacks can 
exploit vulnerabilities in widely used Smart Grid communication 
standards. This paper addresses a deep investigation of attacks 
against the manufacturing message specification of IEC 61850, 
which is expected to become one of the most widely used 
communication services in Smart Grids. We investigate how an 
attacker can build a custom tool to execute man-in-the-middle 
attacks, manipulate data, and affect the physical system. Attack 
capabilities are demonstrated based on NESCOR scenarios to 
make it possible to thoroughly test these scenarios in a real 
system. The goal is to help understand the potential for such 
attacks, and to aid the development and testing of cyber security 
solutions. An attack use-case is presented that focuses on the 
standard for power utility automation, IEC 61850 in the context 
of inverter-based distributed energy resource devices; especially 
photovoltaics (PV) generators.  
Keywords—Smart Grid security, IEC 61850, man-in-the-middle 
attack, photovoltaics 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The emerging cyber threats facing Smart Grids can be 
illustrated through a trend of recently discovered cyber-attacks. 
Havex is a remote access Trojan (RAT) which targets the open 
platform communication (OPC) standard widely used in 
process control systems. One of the Havex payloads 
enumerates all connected network resources, and uses the 
classic distributed component object model (DCOM) based 
version of the OPC standard to gather information about 
connected control system resources within the network [1]. In 
Dec. 2014, the United States Computer Emergency Response 
Team (US-CERT) had identified BlackEnergy malware which 
compromised industrial control systems in the US for at least 
three years [2]. BlackEnergy discovered on internet-connected 
HMIs including those from GE Cimplicity, Advantech/ 
Broadwin WebAccess, and Siemens WinCC. According to a 
report from Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security 
[3], an advanced persistent threat (APT) group attacked an 
unnamed steel plant in Germany, resulting in significant 
damage. Login credentials were obtained via ‘spear phishing’ 
emails and social engineering techniques. Access was gained to 
the office network, then to the production systems, where a 
situation was initiated where a blast furnace could not shut 
down as normal, causing significant physical damage. Across 
these publicized examples, there is a trend towards the use and 
repurposing of crime-ware with new payload modules and 
functionalities specifically tailored towards intrusions in ICS 
environments. The resulting challenge is to understand and 
address the security gaps, where attackers understand the 
underlying physical systems, and appear to have the capability 
and intent to affect the operation of physical processes. 
In this paper we conduct experiments regarding the cyber-
security and physical effects of attacks conducted in the Smart 
Grid, against equipment using IEC 61850. This is an object 
oriented substation automation standard defining how to 
describe the devices in an electrical substation and how to 
exchange the information about these devices [4]. IEC 61850 
also standardizes the set of abstract communication services 
allowing for compatible exchange of information among 
components of a power system. IEC 61850 offers three types 
of communication models: client/server type communication 
services model, a publisher-subscriber model and sample 
values model for multicast measurement values. The generic 
object oriented substation event (GOOSE) is a multicast 
message containing information that allows the receiving 
device to know that a status has changed and the time of the 
last status is changed. Because GOOSE does not support any 
authentication or encryption techniques, it is vulnerable to 
many cyber-attacks [9], [10], [11]. Manufacturing message 
specification (MMS) is one of the communication services 
widely used in IEC 61850. A TCP/IP connection is vulnerable 
to the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack and MMS is also 
vulnerable to the MITM attack because MMS operates over 
standard TCP/IP and has no encryption [12]. 
In our experiments, a test environment comprising a 
photovoltaic (PV) installation is used to investigate and 
demonstrate a custom attack payload that can execute MITM 
attacks, manipulate data, and affect the physical system. The 
experiments are motivated by a set of National Electric Sector 
Cybersecurity Organization Resource (NESCOR) failure 
scenarios [16], which are applied to the physical test-bed. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
II summarizes the related work. Section III describes attack 
capabilities based on the MITM attack. Section IV presents a 
case study at the physical test-bed and Section V discusses 
some issues. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and 
outlines avenues for future work. 
II. RELATED WORK
Much of the existing published work investigating the 
insecurity and exploitation of ICS communications focuses on 
Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5 and IEC 61850. A key 
vulnerability for most systems is the lack of authentication or 
validation mechanisms. Although standards and mechanisms 
exist to address these issues (e.g. IEC 62351), their use in the 
real world is relatively uncommon at present. 
M. Robinson [5] covers possible attack vectors such as lack 
of protocol security in MODBUS and DNP3. It discusses 
potential attacks like replay, MITM and spoofing. T. Morris et 
al. [6] investigates attacks such as response and measurement 
injection, and command injection using the MODBUS 
protocol. The paper details various levels of injection attacks 
ranging from naive injection which randomly injects values to 
complex injections, or target specific fields and values based 
on domain knowledge. Y. Yang et al. [7] details how MITM 
can be accomplished on smart grids. Gao et al. [8] shows 
command injection using Ettercap and other techniques. P. 
Maynard et al. performed the MITM attack against IEC 60870-
5-104 which is widely used in control communication for 
water, gas and electricity and operates over TCP/IP [13]. 
J. Hoyos et al. [9] demonstrated a practical GOOSE 
message spoof attack. They identify GOOSE messages by 
looking for the specific Ether-type, 0x88B8, in Ethernet 
frames. After decoding GOOSE messages, they overwrite 
values, e.g., stNum, sqNum and values inside the data sets. 
They find out the GOOSE message interval by observing 
legitimate messages and they inject false (spoofed) messages 
within the observed interval. As a modification attack, they 
changed a data value to cause the intelligent electronic devices 
(IED) to trip the relay that could control a circuit breaker or 
switch in a real substation. N. Kush et al. [10] presented three 
variants of GOOSE ‘poisoning’ that: prevent legitimate 
GOOSE messages from being processed; hijack the 
communication, which can be used to implement a denial of 
service (DoS) attack; or manipulate the GOOSE subscriber. In 
the attacks, they multicast a single or a range of spoofed 
GOOSE messages with a status number which is high enough 
to cause the subscriber not to service any legitimate GOOSE 
messages with status numbers that are equal or less. As a result, 
they can then control the subscriber. 
J. Hong et al. [11] simulated several cyber-attacks targeting 
IEC 61850-based Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) systems, e.g., replay, packet modification, injection 
and DoS attacks. They specially targeted GOOSE and sampled 
values (SV) which are multicast messages of IEC 61850 
standard. In their test-bed, an IED subscribes to SV of voltage 
and current values from a Merging Unit and a circuit breaker 
subscribes to GOOSE from the IED. By broadcasting 
previously captured or generated GOOSE and SV messages to 
the substation LAN, an attacker could open the circuit breaker. 
The above attacks are exploiting the lack of authentication 
and encryption at the data-link layer and GOOSE and SV do 
not include any of authentication and encryption. MMS is an 
alternative communication protocol of IEC 61850 but it is also 
vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack because MMS 
operates over TCP/IP. Published research on MMS is lacking, 
and this is the area in which this paper now focuses. 
III. ATTACKING  IEC 61850
In this section, attacks on power utility automation devices 
(i.e., IED) and SCADA systems are described. First, the MITM 
attack will be explained, which will be the basis of further 
attacks. Then, we will describe what specific attacks are 
possible against devices and systems that use IEC 61850 MMS 
communication. Finally, the described attack scenarios are 
compared against specific scenarios outlined by NESCOR. Our 
attack capabilities focus on the standard for power utility 
automation, IEC 61850, in the context of inverter-based 
distributed energy resource (DER) devices; especially on PV 
systems [14]. In the experiments here are some assumptions: 1) 
at least one of hosts in the network is already compromised by 
an attacker, which may be achieved using a ‘typical’ 
combination of phishing, malware, and so on as outlined in the 
Introduction; 2) target devices are connected to the same 
network; 3) the attacker is able to sniff traffic and identify the 
IP addresses and port numbers of target devices using the 
targeted application-level protocol, e.g. IEC 61850. 
A. IEC 61850 
IEC 61850 is an object oriented substation automation 
standard that defines how to describe devices in an electrical 
substation and how to exchange the information about these 
devices [4]. The IEC 61850 information model is based on two 
main levels of modelling: the breakdown of a real device 
(physical device) into logical devices, and the breakdown of 
logical device into logical nodes, data objects and data 
attributes. The approach of IEC 61850 is to decompose the 
application functions into the smallest entities which are used 
to exchange information. These entities are called Logical 
Nodes (LN); for example a virtual representation of a circuit 
breaker class, with a standardized class name such as XCBR 
[15]. IEC 61850 also standardizes the set of abstract 
communication services (Abstract Communication Service 
Interface–ACSI) allowing for compatible exchange of 
information among components of a power system. IEC 61850 
offers three types of communication models: client/server type 
communication services model, a publisher-subscriber model 
and sample values model for multicast measurement values. 
Fig. 1 shows the communication stack of IEC 61850. 
The GOOSE message structure supports the exchange of a 
wide range of possible common data organized by a dataset. 
The GOOSE message is multicast and is received by the IEDs 
which have been configured to subscribe to it. GOOSE 
messages contain information that allows the receiving device 
to know that a status has changed and the time of the last status 
is changed. IEC 61850 also defines mappings between the 
abstract services/objects to a specific protocol such as MMS. 
For the sake of brevity, we will not go into detail of these 
mappings here, other than to say MMS objects and services can 
be mapped according to the IEC 61850-8-1 specification. 
 
Fig. 1  IEC 61850 communication stack 
B. Man-in-the-middle Attack 
Our principal interest is the ability to facilitate manipulation 
of data at Layer 7, the application layer. A MITM attacker is 
placed in the middle of the connection between victims by 
hijacking the connection or making independent connections 
with the victims. The attacker can make the victims believe 
they are talking directly to each other by relaying messages 
between them. There are several Layer 2 techniques for MITM 
network attacks. Address resolution protocol (ARP) is used for 
resolution of IP addresses into MAC addresses. To resolve the 
MAC address, an ARP request is sent out on the LAN. The 
machine with the IP address then responds its MAC address 
within an ARP reply. ARP is a stateless and trusted protocol, 
so hosts will cache any ARP replies they receive, regardless of 
whether they requested information. ARP entries will be 
overwritten when a new ARP reply is received. ARP has no 
method to authenticate the origination of the message. This 
allows ARP spoofing that associates the attacker’s MAC 
address with the IP address of a victim by sending spoofed 
ARP replies onto the LAN. Then, any traffic meant for that IP 
address will be sent to the attacker instead. 
 
Fig. 2  ARP poisoning 
 
As shown in Fig. 2, an attacker can send spoofed ARP 
replies to poison the ARP cache of each victim. The spoofed 
ARP entry will be stored in the ARP cache. When two victims 
send any messages to each other, the messages will contain the 
attacker’s MAC address so the messages will be delivered to 
the attacker. The attacker will relay the messages to the original 
destination to make the victims believe that their messages are 
well delivered. 
C. Attack Capabilities 
MMS is one of communication services widely used in IEC 
61850 and operates over standard TCP/IP. By ARP spoofing, 
an attacker can launch the MITM attack on the MMS 
communications of IEC 61850 devices. There are several types 
of attacks that the attacker can produce based on the MITM 
attack, and four types of them will be explained in this section; 
eavesdropping, modification, injection, and DoS attacks. Even 
if an attacker successfully achieved the MITM attack on the 
target, the attacker might want to gather more useful 
information by eavesdropping the hijacked or tapped 
communication before carrying out any further attacks. The 
attacker can observe all traffic between two devices and gather 
device-level information by decoding MMS messages. This 
enables attacks to be executed at Layer 7, the application layer. 
During the MITM attack, the attacker will get messages 
from one device, modify them, and then relay the messages to 
the intended destination. Modification attacks can be used for 
example to hide or falsify measurements about the devices, and 
hence the underlying physical system, or to send undesired 
commands to the devices. After modification, checksum fields 
in the message should be recalculated before forwarding. MMS 
used for the client/server communication in IEC 61850 doesn’t 
have any checksum field but TCP has a checksum field in the 
header. If the length of the message is changed, the sequence 
and acknowledgement fields of the messages should be 
adjusted as well as for all the following messages to maintain 
the communication between the devices. 
After any injection is complete on the communication, the 
attacker will need to manage some side-effects of the injection. 
First, there might be some responses from the target machine, 
due the injected message, that the attacker needs to drop or 
alter. Second, any sequence and acknowledgement information 
needs to be corrected during the rest of communication. This 
includes sequence and acknowledgement fields in the TCP 
header, and the invoke ID field in MMS messages. Without 
this adjustment, the communication between devices will be 
terminated or reset. There are also several DoS attacks to be 
perpetrated against IEC 61850 devices, based on the MITM 
attack. First, an attacker can skip the relay step of the MITM 
attack, effectively blocking all messages to the original 
destination. Second, the attacker can modify all data in 
messages so devices never get the correct data. Lastly, the 
attacker can inject termination commands to devices. 
D. Implementation 
To implement the attacks, Ettercap is used along with a 
customized plug-in designed for targeted attacks against IEC 
61850 MMS communications. The ability and expertise to 
develop such a payload, which can successfully interact with 
the ICS commands, is the key aspect differentiates the skills of 
an average attacker from one that can realize a physical effect 
on a target system. For obvious reasons, the detailed design of 
this attack plug-in is not discussed here. Using Ettercap and 
this custom plug-in the MITM attack can be launched on the 
communication between two machines, A and B, by running 
Ettercap with ‘-M arp /IP address of A/ /IP address of B/’ 
options that will execute ARP poisoning targeting two given IP 
addresses. The custom attack is loaded by giving another 
option ‘-P mitm_61850’ when we run Ettercap, where 
‘mitm_61850’ is the name of the plug-in (see Fig. 3). 
Fig. 3  Ettercap execution 
Once the MITM attack is launched, and the customized 
plug-in loaded, the tool receives all packets between targets 
and the plug-in can modify the packets. It can decode MMS 
packets by using the Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) 
Basic Encoding Rules (BER) to get detailed information of 
devices. It is designed to modify packets before forwarding 
them and can drop packets or inject craft packets as shown in 
Fig. 4. To maintain the connection, it recalculates the 
checksum of modified packets and adjusts sequence and 
acknowledgement numbers if a packet is injected or dropped. 
Checksum recalculation is supported in Ettercap but sequence 
and acknowledgement adjustment is done independently. 
Fig. 4  Customized Ettercap plug-in outputs: two injections and two drops 
IV. CASE STUDY : PV INVERTER
A. Remote Commands for DER Units 
State-of-the art DER installations feature a power grid 
operator interface for external control commands. The 
minimum size of installations from which such an interface is 
required, as well as protocols and command sets used depend 
on local grid codes. A typical application of such SCADA 
connections to DER units is power shedding. This is necessary 
when generation is significantly higher, or load is significantly 
lower, than planned. It can also be necessary in case of 
emergency situations such as a split of the interconnected 
transmission grid in larger sub-systems (see e.g. [17]). 
Although in practice, heterogeneous solutions for remote 
control of DER units are used, we selected a likely near-future 
scenario in which a PV inverter is equipped with an IEC 61850 
interface [18], [19]. The effect of attacking a single DER unit is 
of course low. However, assuming that a large number of units 
are involved, e.g. the NECOR scenarios as discussed later, 
consequences can range from monetary losses for DER and 
grid operator up to physical damage and power failures. 
B. Laboratory Setup 
The demonstration of the attack capability is carried out in 
a defined environment, the AIT SmartEST laboratory. The 
SmartEST lab offers an environment for testing, verification 
and R&D in the field of large scale distributed energy system 
integration and smart grids applications. The laboratory 
infrastructure accommodates DER components as inverters, 
storage systems, combined heat and power (CHP) units, 
voltage regulators/controllers, and other types of related 
electrical equipment. Powerful controllable AC and DC 
sources allow full-power testing capability up to 1 MVA (AC), 
including a high-performance PV array simulation (DC).  
The laboratory setup includes a commercial off-the-shelf 20 
kW PV inverter connected to a PV simulator as power source 
and a laboratory current sink as model for the power grid 
connection. The inverter itself has no IEC 61850 capabilities. 
These are added by a gateway component on the basis of 
Raspberry Pi (R-Pi) hardware, which essentially serves as a 
programmable gateway between an IEC 61850 SCADA 
network and the inverters in-built Modbus interface (see Fig. 5) 
[14]. The programmable functions of the gateway controller 
are realized using the IEC 61499 reference model for 
distributed automation. For the purposes of experimentation the 
communications network that is externally accessible ends at 
the IEC 61850 interface of the R-Pi controller. 
Fig. 5  Lab setup used to demonstrate the MITM attack on a PV inverter 
C. Attacks to PV Inverter 
For the purpose of the experiments we assume that an 
attacker has already compromised a machine which is 
connected to the same LAN and identified the IP addresses of 
the target inverter and controller devices. In the compromised 
machine, the attacker can easily execute the MITM attack on 
the target devices by using ARP poisoning as described in the 
previous Section III-A. Once the attacker executes the MITM 
attack with target IP addresses, the attacker can get all packets 
between the target devices. In our demonstration, Ettercap is 
used to execute ARP poisoning for the MITM attack and a 
customized plug-in is implemented and loaded to execute 
further attacks on the communication between the target 
devices. As shown in Fig. 5, the R-Pi is the translator between 
MODBUS and IEC 61850 for the PV inverter and its IP 
address ends with 111. A SCADA system is a monitoring 
client to the PV inverter via the R-Pi and its IP address ends 
with 121. Note it is assumed an attacker has already 
compromised a machine in the same LAN. 
Fig. 6 shows packet captures of our attack demonstration at 
the client-side, which is a SCADA system. ‘No.’ is the 
sequence number of packet and ‘Source’ and ‘Destination’ are 
source and destination IP addresses. Protocol and the length of 
packet are also shown and a short information of packet is 
shown in the ‘Info’ column. We used Wireshark to capture the 
packets at the client, which is controlled by a legitimate 
operator. The operator at the client behaves a predefined 
normal scenario controlling the power limitation of PV 
inverter. The first seven packets are initialization packets for a 
new MMS connection and the operator made seven confirmed-
requests and got seven responses for the requests. 
Fig. 6  Packer captures at client-side (SCADA system) 
The first confirmed-request (#1060) is a 
‘getVariableAccessAttributes’ request to get the type of a given 
data attribute and the second confirmed-request (#1062) is a 
write request to change the value of ‘MaxWLim’ as 
‘0x082C80000’ which is the floating value of ‘100’ as shown 
in Fig. 7. (Note that the actual attribute names are intentionally 
partially redacted). This write request sets the power limitation 
of the PV inverter to 100%. 
Fig. 7  Write request to 100% of power limitation (by operator) 
A read request (#1335) for the same data attribute, 
‘MaxWLim’ has been sent and the value of ‘MaxWLim’ is set 
as requested by the previous write request as shown in Fig. 
8(b). After another ‘getVariableAccessAttributes’ request 
(#1699), there is another write request (#1701) to change the 
value of ‘MaxWLim’ as ‘0x084270000’ which is the floating 
value of ‘60’ as shown in Fig. 9. At this time the operation has 
been to set the maximum power limit to 60% of possible power 
output. The operator also checked the value of ‘MaxWLim’ by 
sending a read request (#1986) and Fig. 10 shows that it is set 
as requested. 
(a) Read request 
(b) Read response 
Fig. 8  Read request (a) and response (b) with 100% of power limitation 
Fig. 9  Write request to 60% of power limitation (by operator) 
Fig. 10  Read response with 60% of power limitation at client-side 
As shown in Fig. 11, the power limitation has been changed 
to ‘0x084120000’, which is ‘10’, when the operate checks the 
power limitation by sending a read request (#2806). There is no 
write request between two read requests (#1986 and #2806). 
Without any action from the operator, the power limitation has 
been changed to 10%. Fig. 12 shows the packet captures at the 
server-side, R-Pi. The first seven packets are for MMS 
initialization and the R-Pi got nine confirmed-requests and 
made nine responses for the requests. Note that there are two 
more requests in the packet captures at the R-Pi. The first six 
pairs of confirmed-request and response are the same packets 
that we’ve seen in the packet captures at the client-side. 
As shown in Fig. 13, the power limitation is 
‘0x0842700000’ which is the same value as shown in Fig. 9.  
 
Fig. 11  Read response with 10% of power limitation at client-side 
 
 
Fig. 12  Packet captures at server-side (R-Pi) 
 
 
Fig. 13  Read response with 60% of power limitation at server-side 
 
The last pair of confirmed-request and response is also 
same with the last pair in the packet captures at the client side 
(see Fig. 11 and Fig. 14). However, two confirmed-requests 
(#2099 and #2705) and two confirmed-responses (#2100 and 
#2706) cannot be found in the packet captures at the client-side 
but those packets don’t have any different IP address. Those 
packets are highlighted by a red rectangle in the Fig. 15. 
 
Fig. 14  Read response with 10% of power limitation at server-side 
 
 
(a) Injected write request to 40% of power limitation 
 
(b) Injected write request to 10% of power limitation 
Fig. 15  Two injected write requests by the attacker 
 
The new two confirmed-requests (#2099, #2705) are write 
requests to change the data attribute ‘MaxWLim’ to 
‘0x0842200000’ and ‘0x0841200000’, respectively. The latter 
value is the value seen in the last read response in the packer 
captures at the client-side. These two requests have been 
injected by the attacker and the responses of the two requests 
have been dropped to prevent being sent to the legitimate 
client, (the operator) as shown in Fig. 4. As a summary, the 
attacker can eavesdrop, modify, inject and drop packets based 
on the MITM attack. As a case study, false MMS packets 
which can maliciously set the power limitation to any desired 
values. Note that no packet which is captured at the client-side, 
so the controlling system is not aware of such changes. 
D. Physical Impact on PV Inverter 
In this section, we will highlight the physical impact of the 
attacks on the PV inverter. In the experiments there are two 
ways to record and observe the electrical output of the PV 
inverter system. Fig. 16 shows the PV simulated panel on the 
left (it is worth noting the “simulated” panel produces real 
physical electrical outputs and responses).  The graph shows 
the characteristic voltage vs. current curve, and power output, 
for the PV panel. A green cross shows the maximum power 
point, i.e. the theoretical maximum power output of the PV 
panel. The red cross shows the real power point at which the 
system is currently operating. Normally the inverter tries to 
operate at the maximum power point, as shown in Fig. 16-(a), 
where the red and green crosses overlap. The PV inverter can 
be programmed with different power limitation set-points, such 
that the power output is limited (up to100%). In such a case the 
operating point (red cross) moves away from the maximum 
power point. 
   
(a) 100% of power limitation by the operator 
   
(b) 60% of power limitation by the operator 
   
(c) 10% of power limitation by the attacker 
Fig. 16  Status changes of PV inverter: (a) 100% power limitation, (b) 60% 
power limitation, and (c) 10% power limitation, causing a standby state 
 
Before executing any cyber-attacks, the operator has set the 
power limitation to 100% and the PV inverter generates AC 
output power of 10,487 W as shown in Fig. 16-(a). When the 
operator set the power limitation to 60%, the PV inverter 
generates 7,067 W of the AC output power as shown in Fig. 
16-(b). After capturing and analyzing the communications 
during this valid operation, as described in the previous section, 
an attacker is now able to craft malicious packets and execute 
an attack to set the power limitation to a value of their choice. 
The Ettercap tool presented in this paper allows any vale to be 
selected. In the example shown Fig. 16-(c) the attacker sets this 
value to 10%. As the result of this new set-point, the PV 
inverter is forced to physically switched off, and it can be seen 
that in Fig. 16-(c) the LCD display shows it has fallen into 
standby mode. At this point the device is non-operational and 
requires several minutes to restart. 
V. DISCUSSION 
Plain text transmissions that lack encryption and 
authentication make the underlying physical systems 
vulnerable to various types of cyber-attacks. IEC 61850 itself 
does not specify security aspects and does not enforce any 
authentication or encryption in GOOSE and SV. MMS has 
authentication and access control functionalities but MMS 
itself is not designed with information security in mind [14]. 
The MITM attack can be launched even in the presence of such 
authentication and the attacker can read all packets in a typical 
implementation where there is no encryption. 
IEC 62351 is a set of standards handling information 
security for communication protocols including IEC 61580, 
IEC 60870-5-104 and DNP3 [20]. IEC 62351-4 [21] specifies 
procedures, protocol extensions, and algorithms to facilitate 
securing MMS based applications. It recommends to use 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) to secure the MMS 
communications. However one reason for lack of adoption, as 
M. Chowdhury et al. [22] point out, is that legacy embedded 
systems may have concerns such as high run-time memory 
usage and considerable increase of data read and write times 
because of the limited resources. 
A. NESCOR Mappings 
The experiments and attack scenarios presented in this 
work have been designed to map to a number of NESCOR 
failure scenarios [16] that defines several DER scenarios. The 
attacker capabilities in the following scenarios map directly to 
the capabilities demonstrated in our experiments:  
DER.14 defines a threat agent that spoofs DER control 
commands to perform emergency shutdowns of a large number 
of DER systems simultaneously. A threat agent (the attacker) 
can use the MITM attack to perform modification on DER 
SCADA control commands. The attacker can capture all 
messages from and to the target DER systems, and can 
therefore modify captured control commands causing 
emergency shutdowns or stops of the target DER systems. The 
number of DER systems is not a problem as long as the DER 
systems are connected in the same network. This attack 
scenario could make the target power system unstable and 
cause outages and power quality problems. 
DER.15 identifies a threat agent that modifies data being 
monitored by the utility distribution DER SCADA system in 
real-time, altering the load value so that it is higher than the 
actual value. An attacker can use the MITM attack to perform 
modification on DER data. The attacker can capture messages 
to the target DER SCADA systems and the attacker can alter 
captured data to predefined or random values. The attacker can 
also observe the data over a period of time to figure out 
appropriate values for this modification. DER.15, suggests this 
attack scenario could increase utility costs for unnecessary 
ancillary services, as just one of many possible outcomes. 
DER.16 describes a threat agent that breaches a DER 
SCADA system and causes the DER SCADA system to issue 
an invalid command to all DER systems. An attacker can use a 
MITM attack to perform modification and injection attacks on 
the connections of the target system. The attacker can capture 
some messages, modify them to include invalid commands, 
and then relay the invalid commands to DER systems. Invalid 
commands could be chosen at random. DER.16 suggests this 
scenario could make the power system experience immediate 
and rapid fluctuations as some DER systems shut down while 
others go into default mode, with no Volt/VAR support, others 
revert to full output, and a few become islanded micro-girds. It 
might also cause equipment damage due to power system 
surges and sags and transmission power quality problem. 
VI. CONCLUSION
IEC 61850 is becoming increasingly widely adopted in 
Smart Grids to support power automation systems. GOOSE, 
SV and MMS are communication services which can be used 
to exchange information among IEC 61850 devices. Previous 
published works have investigated attack capabilities against 
GOOSE and SV, but not MMS. In this paper, we derived and 
implemented cyber-attack capabilities based on MITM attacks 
in an electrical system which uses MMS communications. This 
work has been verified in a test-bed environment using real 
physical PV devices and communications. Most other 
publications also tend to lack extensive verification in realistic 
environments. The experiments have demonstrated the 
capability to cause a physical effect on the electrical devices 
and underlying system operation.  This was achieved via 
malicious manipulation of power limits, thus changing the 
physical operation of PV inverter devices, or indeed to cause 
them to switch off, without the knowledge of the operator at 
the SCADA system. The operations of the described custom 
Ettercap attack payload, and the resulting physical 
consequences, have proven consistent with the attack 
capabilities, scenarios and consequences outlined by NESCOR. 
A significant contribution of this work is the development of a 
Havex-like malware payload that can be used for continued 
research into threat modelling, penetration testing, and 
designing security approaches for the described IEC 61850 PV 
environment, consistent with the priorities described by 
NESCOR. 
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